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Maroeconomic  Adjustment
and  Growth
Colombia's. impressive fiscal adjustment during  development Iending as a percentage of GDP
1985-87 was due to structural changes in fiscal  fell slightly during the same period.
policy, concludes Easterly-not  simply to such  Perhaps partly becat  e of public debt
fortuitous events as the coffee boom.  behavior, real interest rates remained very high
Losses of public financial institutions were  and inflation accelerated slightly.  Improving on
important in some other Latin American coun-  adjustment would probably require reducing
tries but there is no evidence that they were a  interest rates and inflation.
major factor in Colombia. The data suggest that  Easterly's model simulations suggest that to
the Banco de la Republica and other public  reduce interest rates to more manageable levels
financial institutions suffered a small quasi-  would requirc continued reduction of 1' - fiscal
fiscal loss, but that that loss was not the domi-  deficit, below levels currently envisioned.  To
nant factor in fiscal behavior.  reduce inflation would require even tighter fiscal
Although impressive, the fiscal adjustment  policy.
fell short of actually improving the govern-  The magnitudes of required deficit reduction
ment's net financial position. Total public debt  do not seem out of reach however, even allow-
Ps a percentage of GDP was roughly unchanged  ing for uncertainty about the figures. Continued
from its 1984 value at the end of 1987, even  policy initiatives would help Colombia confront
after correcting for the effect of currency devalu-  the fiscal challenges of the 1  990s.
ation on dollar-denominated instruments. Public
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A key  component  of the  largely  successful  adjustment  program
Colombia  has followed  since  1985  has  been the  4mprovement  in the  fiscal
deficit. Starting  from  a  position  of severe  imbalances  in  both  the  external
and  fiscal  accounts  prior  to 1985.  Colombia  had achieved  surpluses  in  both
accounts  by 1986. Although  both  have since  reverted  to deficit,  the  levels
are  much lower  than  before  the  onset  of adjustment.  At the  same  time,  other
indicators  of economic  performance  have  been favorable.  Substantial  growth
retutned  in 1986-87  (over  5  percent),  and  export  performance  was  buoyant,  at
least  partially  in response  to the  major  exchange  rate  adjustment  that
accompanied  the  adjustment  program.  Inflation  performance  has  been  good for
most  of the  adjustment  period,  remaining  relatively  constant  at around  22
percent  despite  the  rapid  rate  of currency  devaluation.  Only  recently  (in
1988)  has inflation  accelerated,  which  may in  part reflect  temporary  supply
shocks.1
Despite  the  apparent  success  of the  fiscal  adjustment,  there  are
several  nagging  questions  that  remain. One  question  is  how  much  the fiscal
adjustment  that  was achieved  was the  result  of temporary  and/or  fortuitous
events,  as opposed  to fundamental  policy  changes  which  have lasting  effects.
A  related  question  is  how  the  deficit  reduction  was divided  between  reductions
in investment  and  increases  in  noninterest  current  saving.
There  are  also  more fundamental  questions  about  how  fiscal
adjustment  should  be defined  and  whether  the  traditional  analysis  of the
nonfinancial  public  sector  deficit  is  adequate. Public  financial
l.The  nature  of the  imbalances  is summarized  nicely  in Thomas  (1985). A
sumnuy of the  adjustment  program  can  be found  in  Ocampo  (1987),  and  Garcia
(198'j).-2-
intermediaries,  especially  the  central  bank,  sometime  contribute  to public
deficits  through  losso:  suffered  on their  financial  operations.  Development
credit  extanded  either  by public  finan2ial  intermediaries  or the  nonfinancial
public  sector  has  to be financed  just  as do traditional  public  expenditures.
To capture  &ll  of these  factors,  the  most comprehensive  definition  of the
public  sector  would  be through  its  total  financing  requirements.  This is  also
useful  from  the  standpoint  of macroeconomic  analysis,  since  it is through  its
financing  needs  that  the  public  sector  comes  to  affect  interest  rates,  private
investment,  inflation,  and  other  macroeconomic  variables.
The  consideration  of  public  flnancing  requirements  leads  naturally
to the  analysis  of public  debt  behavior. This  is the  'bottom  linew  of fiscal
analysis,  since  the  public  debt  captures  the  long-term  cost  of fiscal
policies. The  composition  of public  debt  also  affects  domestic  interest
rates. It  may also  have fiscal  implications  if differentials  exist  between
domestic  and external  interest  rates. The  fiscal  adjustment  of 1985-87  will
therefore  also  be evaluated  from  the  standpoint  of the  impact  on public  debt.
Finally,  and  perhaps  most importantly,  the  future  sustainability  of
current  public  deficits  must  be analyzed. This  can  be done  by evaluating  the
implications  of future  deficits  for  inflation  and  interest  rates,  and  checking
the  consistency  with  policy  targets  for  these  variables.
Structural  fiscal  deficit  adjustment,  1985-87
This section  will evaluate  the  question  of  how  much thi  adjustment
achieved  during  1985-87  reflected  temporary  factors.  There  are  several
temporary  shocks  to  consider  in the  fiscal  accounts. The  public  sector
benefited  from  the  advent  of a fortuitous  rise  in  coffee  prices  during  1986,
which  yielded  enormous  profits  to the  quasi-public  National  Coffee  Federation
(?NC  in Spanish). This  also  contributed  extra  revenue  to the  National-3-
Government  through  the  coffee  export  tax  and  through  special  transfers  from
the  FNC.  The rise  in coffee  prices  was temporary,  as they  fell  again  in 1987.2
However,  by that  time,  substantial  new finds  in  oil reserves  had  begun
yielding  additional  profits  through  the state-owned  oil  company  ECOPETROL.
Finally,  a  major  tax  reform  in 1986  had a large  but  temporary  effect  on the
budget  through  a one-time  tax  amnesty  that  took  effect  in 1987.
The effect  of these  factors  is  shown  in  Table  1,  which shows  the
overall  public  deficit  adjusted  for  the  surpluses  or  deficits  of the  FNC,
ECOPETROL,  and  the  temporary  items  in the  National  Government  budget. The
unadjusted  consolidated  public  deficit  improves  almost  7 percentage  points  of
GDP  between  1984  and  1986,  when a small  surplus  is achieved. There  is some
slippage  in 1987,  when it reverts  to  deficit  again,  so that  the  total
adjustment  over  1984-87  is a little  more than  5  percentage  points. The
corrected  'structural  deficit'  shows  much smoother  behavior. There  is steady
improvement  from  1984  to  1987,  with the  total  adjustment  amounting  to slightly
less  than  5  percentage  points. Thus,  the  adjustment  from  1984  to 1987  is
almost  entirely  due  to structural  factors,  with the  temporary  factors  mainly
affecting  the  path of the  adjustment  and  the  level  of the  remaining  deficit.
Table  1 also  shows  the  composition  of the  adjustment.  We first
remove  the  external  and  internal  interest  payments  to get  the 'structural
primary  deficit". This  reflects  the  impact  of the  current  fiscal  policies,  as
opposed  to the  legacy  of  past deficits  as reflected  in inteorest  on debt. A
deficit  on this  account  exceeding  the  revenue  from  money  creation  is  not
sustainable  in  the long-run. We see  that  a structural  primary  surplus  had in
fact  been  achieved  by 1987. The  improvement  in the  structural  primary  deficit
2.See  Pizano  (1988)  for  a discussion  of the  effect  of the  'coffee  boom'  on
public  finances. Cuddington  (1986)  contains  a  more general  discussion  of
the  role  of coffee  in the  economy.-4-
amounted  to about  6  percentage  points  of GDP  over  1984-87. This  exceeds  the
overall  fiscal  adjustment  since  the  increase  in  public  interest  payments
offset  part  of the  improvement  in the  primary  account.
Finally,  we break  out  investment  expenditure  to see  the  composition
of the  primary  deficit  reversal. The "structural  primary  current
deficit"--i.e.  the  primary  deficit  less  investment--was  negative  throughout
the  period. This simply  means  that  non-interest  public  saving  was positive.
This  component  of the  deficit  improves  about  3  percent  of GDP  over 1984-87.
Thus,  half of the  structural  fiscal  adjustment  was due  to improved  current
saving  and  the  other  half  due  to cutbacks  in investment.  It is unclear  to
what extenc  cutbacks  in investment  reflect  actual  improvement  in  the  long-run
fiscal  picture. If  productive  investment  was cut,  this  will lower  future
public  income  and  so does  not represent  fiscal  improvement. If  projects  were
cut  that  were additions  to sectors  with excess  capacity  or that  were otherwise-
unproductive,  however,  then  this  would  be genuine  fiscal  adjustment.  Past
analysis  of public  investment  in  Colombia  suggests  that  some  of the
investments  cut  were indeed  in  excess  capacity  sectors,  such  as the  electric
sector. The  conclusion  is that  at  a  minimum  3  percentage  points  of the  fiscal
adjustment  was  a long-run  improvement,  while  at least  part  of the  3 percentage
points  that  correspond  to the  cuts  in  public  investment  was an improvement.
Profits/losses  of public  financial  intermediaries
The  central  bank,  Banco  de la  Replblica,  is traditionally  excluded
from  most  measures  of fiscal  behavior  in  Colombia.  However,  it  has some
revenues  and  expenditures  which  are  analogous  to those  in the  nonfinancial
public  sector. Table  2 shows  an account  of the  central  bank  which cover  most,
though  not  all,  of its  operations. This  is the  account  known  as Cuenta-5-
Especial  do Cambios  (CEC). 3 It includes  net income  from  foreign  exchange
reserves,  which represent  net interest  received  on the  country's  international
reserves,  of  which  Banco  de la  Republica  is the  sole  custodian. Other  reserve
income  comes  from  sales  and/or  revaluation  of gold. The  capital  gains  on
holdings  of foreign  currency  show  up on a realization  basis  as currency  is
bought  and  sold. On the  experditure  sie, the  main item  is the  interest
expenditure  on central  bank  bonds  called  titulos  canjeables  (TC's)  (this
category  also  includes  another  type  of central  bank  bond  known  as titulo  de
participacion,  but for  accounting  purposes  all  of the  bonds  are  classified  as
TC's).  Since  some  of these  bonds  are  dollar-denominated,  this  expenditure
includes  also  capital  losses  suffered  on the  bonds  from  currency  devaluation.
These  bonds  are  used in  the  open-market  operations  of  Banco  de la  ReR,iblica  to
control  the  money  supply. Besides  administrative  costs,  the  other  main
expenditure  item  is  the  exchange  rate  differential,  which  reflects  differences.
between  the  exchange  rate  at  which  the  central  bank  values  its  reserves  and
the  price  at  which  they  are  sold  to  the  government  for  foreign  debt repayment.
The  balance  on the  CEC  fluctuates  bet  een  plus and  minus  one  percent
of GDP.  Intenest  on TC's  grows  steadily  as open-market  operations  became  more
important  in 1986-87.  However,  interest  on foreigr.  exchange  reserves  is also
growing,  as is the  profit  on the  purchase  and sale  of foreign  exchange,  both
of  which reflect  the rising  level  of  net international  reserves. A deficit  of
-0.3  percent  of GDP in 1985  thus  becomes  a surplus  of 0.6  percent  of GDP  by
1987. However,  the  profit  on the  sale  and  purchase  of foreign  exchange
essentially  reflects  nominal  capital  gains  on international  reserves,  which
3.A  superb  explanation  and  analysis  of the  CEC is  contained  in  Jaramillo  and
Montenegro  (1982).-6-
should  be excluded  to  be consistent  with standard  deficit  definitions. 4 The
balance  excluding  this  item  shows  a deficit  of  between  0.2  and  0.5  percent  of
GDP  over  1984-88.
The  CEC  is  not a comprehensive  measure  of the  profit  or loss  of the
central  bank  on financial  intermediation.  The  most  notable  omission  is  the
interest  revenue  and  expenditure  of the  Fondos  Financieros,  which  are  the
entities  within  the  central  bank  that  carry  out  development  lending. The
Fondos  raise  financing  through  mandatory  purchases  of their  bonds  at  below-
market  rates  by the  financial  system  (known  as *forced  investments').  They
then  lend  at a subsidized  rate  to the  target  sectors. The  sketchy  data
available  seems  to indicate  that  the  main loss-maker  among  the  Fondos  is the
Fondo  Financiero  Agropecuario,  which  carries  out agricultural  lending. Recent
adjustments  in controlled  interest  rates  applicable  to the  FFAP  have  raised
its  borrowing  rate  faster  than  the  rate  it charges  on loans,  as shown  in table.
3.  Other  fondos  have  a positive  margin  on their  lending. However,  to
estimate  the  profit  or loss  of these  entities,  we need  data  on their  operating
costs  and  their  level  of defaults  on loans. Table  3 shows  some  hypothetical
calculations  which  assume  a 5  percent  operating  cost  ratio  and  a 10 percent
rate  of default. This  yields  a deficit  for  the  Fondos  shown  of between  0.1
and  0.2  percent  of GDP  over  1985-88. It should  be stressed  that  this  is  only
a hypothetical  calculation,  however.
Other  public  financial  intermediaries  exist  outside  the  central
bank.  These  also  engage  in  development  lending  and  any  patential  losses  or
gains  they  realize  should  also  be considered  in  an evaluation  of fiscal
behavior. One  potential  loss-maker  is Cala  Agraria,  the  public  bank
responsible  for  lending  to the  agricultural  sector. It  is estimated  to  have
4.Teijeiro  (1989)  has  a good  discussion  of  principles  of  measuring  central
bank  deficits.-7-
had  cumulative  losses  equal  to 0.7  percent  of  GDP in 1985,  part  of  which  were
concealed  by the  transfer  of  a note  payable  by the  government.  The  stock  of
losses  had  been reduced  to 0.4  percent  of GDP  by the  end  of 1987. Although
Caja  Agraria  continued  to run  small  losses  in 1986-87,  the  rapid  growth  of GDP
allowed  the  cumulative  losses  to decline  in relative  terms.
Another  important  public  financial  entity  is  the  Pondo  de  Garantia
de Instituciones  Financieras,  which  was created  to deal  with the  crisis  in the
financial  system  which  began  in 1982.  Substantial  resources  were contributed
to the  Fondo  de Garantia  by Banco  de la  Repoblica  and  by the  Coffee  Fund,  with
a flow  of gross  credit  of 1.6  percent  of GDP  during  1986  from  these  two
entities,  as  we will see  below. However,  the  evaluation  of  profits  or losses
in an economic  or accounting  sense  raises  many difficult  problems. The  only
source  of income  for  the  Fondo  de Garantia  is interest  on its  loans  to
troubled  banks. It is  difficult  to  value  these  loans  at present,  since  their
value  depends  on the  return  of the  troubled  banks  to profitability,  which is
highly  uncertain. As in the  case  of the  U.S. savings  and  loan  crisis,  the
fiscal  cost  of the  support  to the  financial  system  may  not  be  known  for
several  years. A system  of deposit  insurance  has  been  proposed  to give  the
Fondo  de Garantia  another  source  of income  through  premiums  paid  on deposits.
However,  the system  appears  to face  severe  political  and  legal  obstacles  to
its  implementation.
It is clear  from  this  discussion  that  data  on profits  or losses  of
public  financial  intermediaries,  including  the  central  bank,  are fragmentary
and incomplete.  The  next  section  will present  another  method  of estimating
the  balances  of these  entities  from  the  net  financing  they  utilize,  but  this
approach  also  has  pitfalls. It is clear  that  more research  and  data-gathering
efforts  are  necessary  to evaluate  the  fiscal  burden  of financial
intermediation  performed  by public  entities. Although  these  preliminarycalculations  shov  the deficits  of pubLc  financial  entitieos  to be small in
absolute  terms,  they  can be important  at the  margin  when the authorities  try
to alter fiscal  policy.
Financing  of public sector  deficits
This section  examines  the  magnitude  and significance  of the fiscal
deficits  during 1985-87  from  the financing  side.  The results  are-based  on a
flow-of-funds  exercise  utilizing  data  on Banco de la  RepAblica,  the financial
system,  direct  public  borrowing  from  the  private  sector,  and external  debt
flows. 5 We consider six  classes  of economic  agents: (1)  Banco  de la
Rep6blica,  (2)  the  nonfinancial  public sector,  (3)  public financial
intermediaries  (Banco  Central  Hipotecario,  Financiera  ElActrica  Nacional,  Ca1a
Aeraria,  and  Cala Social),  (4)  private  financial  intermediariec.  (5)  the
nonfinancial  private sector,  and (6)  external  agents.  The changes  in  these
stocks  represent  borrowing  or asset  accumulation  by each sector  (as  well as
revaluation  of liabilities  or assets).
Table  4 shows  the results  of the flow-of-funds  exercise  for  1985-87.
The table  presents  the financing  of the consolidated  nonfinancial  public
sector  and Banco  de la  Rep6blica  in  inflation-adjusted  terms  as a percent  of
GDP.  The inflation  adjustment  subtracts  the  part of the flow  of domestic
financing  that  merely compensates  for the erosion  of the real  value  of debt
outstending. The financing  flo,ws  also  exclude  the revaluation  of external
assets  and liabilities  caused  by depreciation  of the  peso against  the  dollar,
as  well as that  caused  by depreciation  of the dollar  against  non-dollar
currencies  .6
5.An earlier  analysis  of deficit  financing  is  contained  in Restrepo (1987),
which uses somewhat  different  data  and  methodology.
6.Herrera (1988)  has an excellent  analysis  on how to correct  for the  effect  of
inflation  and devaluation  on the change  in financial  wealth  of the  public
sector.-9  -
The  estimates  of  net financing  shown  in  Table  4 are  somewhat  higher
than  the  conventional  measures  of  nonfinancial  public  sector  deficits. The
memo part  of the  table  compares  the  conventional  measure  with the  net
financing  unadjusted  for  inflation. There  are  two  sources  of discrepancy.
One is that  Banco  de la  Republica  is found  to  have  net financing  requirements
(after  correcting  for  capital  gains  on foreign  exchange  reserves)  of around  1
percent  of  GDP.  This  provides  another  estimate  of the  possible  loss  suffered
on quasi-f3.scal  operations  by Banco  de la  Repa6blica.  However,  such  an
estimate  should  be viewed  witia  caution  since  there  are  many  complications  in
making  valuation  adjustments  and  in treating  central  bank  and  government
accounts  consistently.  This  estimate  is larger  than  that  indicated  by the
calculations  on the  operations  through  the  CEC  and  Fondos  Financieros
discussed  above. Tracing  the  source  of this  possible  loss  would  require
further  research.
Even  after  removing  Banco  de la  Rep6blica,  we still  find  tiat  the
consolidated  nonfinancial  public  sector  has  a somewhat  higher  net financing
requirement  in  1985-86  than  that  indicated  by the  conventional  measure. The
financing  estimate  may  well  be more  comprehensive,  since  the  conventional
estimate  is based  on a less  than  complete  sample  of  public  enterprises,  local
governments,  and  national  decentralized  public  entities. The financing
estimate  also includes  some  entities  that  are  financial  in  nature,  such  as the
Instituto  de Credito  Territorial  (although  not  the  public  financial
intermediaries  such  ae PEN  and  Caja  Agraria  mentioned  earlier). However,  in
1987  we find  that  the  financing  estimate  is  nearly  identical  to the
conventional  nonfinancial  public  sector  deficit.
Since  the  table  consolidates  the  nonfinancial  public  sector  and
Banco  de la  Rep6iblica,  money  creation  is shown  as simply  another  way to
finance  the  consolidated  net  deficit. The  inflation  correction  is  not-10-
appropriate  for  monetary  financing,  however,  uince  the  inflationary  erosion  of
the  monetary  liability  is  a tax  on the  holder  which  helps  finance  the  public
sector. The  real  change  in the  monetary  stock  represents  the  change  in demand
for  money  as a  means  of  payment,  the revenues  of  which  accrue  to the
government. This is  presented  as seignorage"  in the  table. In addition,  the
rate  of inflation  times  the  pre-existing  stock  gives  an "inflation  tax,  to the
government.  The sum  of these  two  items  is simply  the  nominal  change  in the
money  stock. This  breakdown  is  shown  in the  table  for  currency  and  financial
system  reserves  on deposits.
The  table  shows  the  Inflation-adjusted  financing  requirement  of the
public  sector  to decrease  from  6.2  percent  of GDP  in 1985  to  2.1  percent  in
1987. Except  for  financial  support  and  other  rediscounts  to the  banking
system,  the  nonmonetary  public  assets  decline  in real  terms  over  the  period.
The  support  of the  banking  system  is  concentrated  in 1986. Thus,  although  it
appears  from  the  conventional  fiscal  accounts  that  most of  the  fiscal
adjustment  took  place  in  1986  and  that  there  was slippage  in 1987,  the  data  on
gross  financing  needs  tell  a different  story. The  large  commitments  for
financial  support  of the  banking  system  made  the  overall  financing  needs  fall
much less  than  the  net  deficit  in 1986.  In 1987,  by contrast,  the reduction  in
the  flow  of lerling  to the  banking  system  more  than  offset  an increase  in the
net  deficit  of the  total  public  sector,  so  that  the  financing  requirement
fell.
A major  change  in the  type  of public  deficit  financing  is  also
evident  over  the  period. While  in 1985  net  external  lending  was still
accounting  for  about  half of total  financing,  it  was drastically  reduced  in
1986-87. Gross  external  financing  was significant  in 1986,  but  practically
all  of it  went into  reserve  accumulation.  Thus,  the  need for  internal
financing  actually  increased  in 1986,  even though  the  total  financing-11-
requirement  fell  significantly.  In 1987,  the  reduction  in financing  needs  and
a small  increase  in  net  external  lending  allowed  the  domestic  financing  to
fall  again.
Examination  of the  composition  of domestic  financing  shows  that
monetary  financing  was the  most  consistently  important. The sum  of currency
creation  and  reserves  held  by the  banking  system  amounted  to about  1.7  percent
of GDP in  all  three  years. The  forced  investments  (including  both inversiones
del  encaie  and inversiones  obligatorias)  are  surprisingly  unimportant  as a
source  of finance. 7 Bond sales  were important  in 1985-86,  but turn  negative
in 1987. Lending  by the financial  system  is  also  volatile--very  significant
in  1986,  much less  so in 1985  and  1987. Lending  from  the  public  financial
intermediaries  is larger  than  that  from  the  private  financial  system.
Another  perspective  on fiscal  policy  in  these  years  comes  from
examingng  the  ratios  of total  public  debt  to  GDP,  shown  in table  5.  These
ratios  capture  the  long  run  impact  of fiscal  policy,  since  they  measure  the
extent  to  which  fiscal  policy  increases  or lowers  the  requirement  for  future
government  saving. An increase  in the  ratio  of government  debt  to GDP  would
require  some  future  increase  in government  saving  to  pay  the  debt service.
Table  5 shows  that  the  initial  year  of the  adjustment  program  was
not successful  in reversing  the  fiscal  deterioration,  as the  debt  ratio
increased  sharply  in 1985. External  debt  increases  particularly  strongly. 8
7.Forced  investments  are  the  mandatory  holdings  of liaoilities  of the  Fondos
Financieros  described  earlier.
8.This  is  not  due  to the  major  currency  devaluation  of 1985,  as the  external
debt  figures  are  evaluated  at the  1987  real  exchange  rate. We also  correct
for  revaluation  of the  external  debt  due  to deprec 4ation  of the  dollar
against  other  industrial  currencies. The  dollar-denominated  domestic
liabilities  of Banco  de la RepUblica  are  also  corrected  for  valuation
changes.-12-
In 1986-87,  the strong  fiscal  adjustment  reduces  the  overall  debt  ratio  by an
amount  that  roughly  offsets  the  increase  of 1985. Surprisingly,  the  strong
fiscal  adjustment  during  1985-87  did  not  actually  lower  the  public  debt  ratio. 9
Table  5 is also  insightful  in shoxring  the  changing  composition  of
public  debt.  The  composition  of debt  at  the  end  of 1984  was  heavily  weighted
towards  external  sources,  which  accounted  for  80 percent  of total  public  debt.
These  proportions  were roughly  maintained  during  1985. During  1986-87,
however,  there  was a shift  towards  internal  debt  as  the  external  debt ratio
declined. The  composition  of internal  debt  was changing  at the  same  time.
Forced  investments  and  bonds  increased  in 1985,  but  then  declined  in 1986-87.
The  expansion  in internal  debt  in 1986-87  was  mainly  fueled  by lending  by
public  financial  institutions,  and  to  a lesser  extent,  by the  private
financial  system.
Meanwhile,  public  financial  assets  were roughly  constant  over
1984-86. Decreased  development  lending  by the  Fondos  Financieros  was  offset
by the  increase  in  public  financial  support  of the  financial  system. In 1987,
public  financial  assets  decline  as a percent  of GDP,  as both  development
lending  and  lending  to the  financial  system  decline.
Table  5 also  shows  that  the real  base  money  stock  declines  over
1984-87. This  reflects  a fall  in the  real  demand  for  the  money  base,  meaning
the  potential  for  financing  through  money  creation  was also  being  eroded.
Thus,  at the  end  of 1987,  the  public  sector's  financial  position  had  not
9.As  noted  earlier,  however,  there  are  many complications  involved  in  making
this  calculation,  so some  margin  of error  should  be allowed  for  in
interpreting  this  result. Possible  complications  include  correcting  for
valuation  changes,  classification  of assets  and  liabilities  and  differing
accounting  methods  between  the  government  and  central  bank.  Robinson  and
Stella  (1988)  recommend  excluding  central  bank  debt  associated  with  normal
monetary  operations,  but it is  difficult  to see  the  economic  justification
for  doing  so.  Further  research  is  needed  in  this  area.-13-
improved  in  absolute  terms  compared  to the  end  of 1984. However,  the  public
sector's  financial  position  was  much  better  at the  end  of 1987  than it  would
have  been in the  absence  of fiscal  correction.
Evaluation  of sustainable  deficits
To evaluate  the  sustainable  fiscal  deficit  and  the  financing
tradeoff  in financing  it,  a simple  model  is  used  that relates  the  portfolio
behavior  of the  private  sector  to the  financing  needs  of the  public  sector. 10
The  Appendix  contains  an algebraic  presentation  of the  model. This section
summarizes  briefly  the  model  and  then  will summarize  the  results.
The financial  behavior  of the  private  sector  is  modeled  with a
standard  Tobin-style  portfolio  model  with some  simplifications.  The  demand  for
currency  depends  only  on inflation  and  real  GDP,  as shown  in the  regression  in
Table  6.11  This implies  that  the  demand  for  currency  is strictly  a
transactions  demand,  with the  real  demand  declining  as the *tax'  on currency
holdings  increases. The  demand  for  non-currency  domestic  financial  assets
depands  on real  interest  rates  and  real  GDP,  as shown  in  the second  regression
in Table  6.
These  results  must be translated  into  portfolio  demands  for  each  of
the  assets  in the  model. We make the  simplifying  assumption  that  all  domestic
lO.This  model is in the  spirit  of the  approach  of  Anand  and  van  Wijnbergen
(1989)  and  van  Wijnbergen,  et.al.  (1988)  to  modelling  inflation  and
sustainable  deficits  in  Turkey,  with the  addition  of an endogenous  interest
rate  and  an analysis  of transitional  portfolio  shifts. Easterly  (1989)
derives  static  and  dynamic  results  for  a similar  type  of  model.
ll.Steiner  (1988)  has  an alternative  estimate  of the  demand  for  currency  as a
function  of nominal  interest  rates. His  equations  show  much lower
elasticities.-14-
noncurrency  assets  are  perfect  substitutes  and  carry  the  same  interest  rate.
The  shares  of each  of these  assets  in  the  domestic  non-currency  portfolio  are
assumed  to remain  the  same  as in  1987. The real  demand  for  currency  is
independent  of the  size  of the  portfolio,  with the  desired  ratio  of currency
to  GDP depending  only  on the  inflation  rate. The  share  of the  noncurrency
assets  which go  to domestic  assets  depends  on the  domestic  real  interest  rate,
with the  elasticity  given  by the  regression  in  Table  6.  The  remainder  goes
into  foreign  currency  assets.
The  asset  side  of private  financial  behavior  is  assumed  to be
strictly  separated  from  the  liability  side. 12 The demands  for  credit  by the
private  sector  are  modeled  as part  of the  investment  decision. Regression  3
in Table  6 shows  the  ratio  of  private  investment  to  GDP  as a function  of the
real  interest  rate. We assume  that  private  foreign  borrowing  is rationed  by
external  capital  markets  and/or  the  government.  Lending  by public  financial
institutions  and  the  central  bank  is  determined  exogenously  as a  matter  of
government  credit  policy. Domestic  borrowing  then  becomes  the  residual  source
of finance  for  investment,  and  thus  is  a function  of real  interest  rates  as in
regression  3.
The  financial  institutions  have their  behavior  determined  largely  by
reguilation.  They  are  required  to set  aside  fixed  percentages  of their
portfolio  in reserves,  reserve  investments,  and  forced  investments. 13 The
12.This  could  reflect,  for  example,  an institutional  distinction  between
consumers  and  private  firms.
13.Montes  and  Carrasquilla  (1986)  have  a  model  of regulatory  determinants  of
the interest  rate  structure. Correa  (1986)  also  has  an insightful
discussion  of the  effects  of the financial  regulations.private  financial  system  supplies  the  credit  demanded  by the  nonfinancial
private  sector  at a given  interest  rate,  then  supplies  the  remainder  to the
government. Public  financial  intermediaries  deliver  credit  to  the  public  and
private  sectors  in  fixed  proportions,  which  are  based  on the  1987  portfolio
shares.
The external  sector  is determined  on the  assumption  that  there  is
external  credit  rationing  and  a government  target  for  its  own  external
borrowing. The  external  credit  rationing  takes  the  form  of fixed  external
debt ratios  for  the  private  sector  and  financial  system. The  government  sets
targets  for  its  external  borrowing  and  reserve  accumulation  at the  central
bank,  and  external  flows  are  determined  accordingly.
The  model  is  closed  by endogenously  determining  the  government
deficit  on the  basis  of available  financing. The  inflation  rate  and  interest
rate  are  set  exogenously,  which  then  implies  a given  financeable  government
deficit. This  can  be thought  of as determining  the  consistency  of the  fiscal
deficit  with  macroeconomic  targets  for  interest  rates  and inflation.
Table  7  shows  a simulation  of the  model  which  calculates  the  deficit
consistent  with roughly  unchanged  inflation  and  real  interest  rates  over
1988-92. We assume  the  28.5  percent  inflation  that  took  place  during  1988  is
reduced  to 24 percent  in 1989,  then  continues  at this  rate  for  the  rest  of the
period. Real interest  rates  remain  constant  at their  1988  levels,  which
implies  that  the  internal  debt  of the  government  will stay  roughly  constant
relative  to  GDP.  The  external  debt  ratio  also is  assumed  to stay  constant.
The resulting  financing  supplied  to the  government  amounts  to 4.8  percent  of
GDP in 1988,  then  declines  to 4.4  percent  of  GDP in 1989-92.14  After
projecting  the  development  lending  flows,  this  implies  net  financing  for  the
14.The  decline  in financing  is  because  of the  reduction  in inflation.-16-
consolidated  public  sector  plus  central  bank of 3.7  percent  in  1988  and  3.5
percent  for  the  rest  of the  period. After  allowing  for  the  net financing  of
the  central  bank and  the  residual  between  the  financing  definition  of the
public  deficit  and  the  conventional  definition,  a conventional  nonfinancial
public  deficit  of 2.7  percent  of  GDP is  estimated  for  1988.  This  declines
slightly  to  2.4  percent  of GDP  over  1989-1992.  As shown  in the  table,  this
implies a primary surplus  of 1.3 percent of GDP, as compared  to a primary
surplus  of 2.0  percent  in 1987.
However,  this  outcome  is  not  the  most desirable  because  of the  high
real  interest  rates  that  are  required  to  maintain  this  financing  level. Table
7 shows  the  estimate  of the  model  that  the  real  lending  interest  rate
necessa..,  to finance  the  deficit  in 1988  was 15.7  percent,  an increase  of 1.9
percentage  points  over  1987. Since  controls  were in  place  during  part  of
1988,  this  can  be interpreted  as the *shadow"  or  market-clearing  interest
rate.  The  model  implies  that  it is  necessary  for  interest  rates  to remain  at
this  high level  to finance  the  projected  nonfinancial  public  deficit  of 2.4
percent  over  1989-92. This  is likely  to be inconsistent  with the  ccatinuing
revival  of private  investment  necessary  to support  growth.
This  projection  also  supposes  that  the  current  structure  of interest
rates  remains  in  place. Thus,  real  interest  rates  on forced  investments
continue  to be  negative,  while  the  interest  rate  on development  credits
remains  below  the  rate  for  commercial  loans. This  implies  that  the  benefits
of the  high real  interest  rate  in  attracting  financial  savings  is  not fully
realized,  since  real  deposit  rates  are six  percentage  points  below  loan  rates.
We thus consider an alternative simulation --  shown in table 8 --  in
which real  loan  interest  rates  will be steadily  reduced,  with a total
reduction  of 9 percentage  points  over the  period. This  is accomplished  in
part  by changing  the  interest  rate  structure  through  increasing  the  real-17-
interest  rate  paid on forced  investments  and  by moving  the interest  rate  on
development  credits  towards  the  rate  on commercial  loans. Thus,  the spread
between  d&posit  and  loan -- ter is reduced  and  real  deposit  rates  fall  only  6
percentage  points.
The fall  in  real  interest  rates  reduces  the  domestic  debt financing
to the  government. This  reduces  the  total  financeable  deficit  to 1.9  percent
in 1989  and 1.6  percent  by 1991.  However,  the  financeable  deficit  increases
again  to 2.1  percent  of GDP in  1992 (and  following  years)  after  interest  rates
stabilize  at the  lower  level. It is  necessary  for  the  deficit  to decrease
more in  the short  run  than  in the  long  run  because  the  one-time  portfolio
shift  reduces  the  domestic  financing  available  during  the  transition.
The  change  in interest  rate  structure  also  affects  central  bank
financing  requirements.  There  are  two  offsetting  effects. On one  hand,  the
increase  in rates  paid on forced  investments  without  a  compensating  increase
in  development  credit  interest  rates  increase  central  bank losses. On the
other  hand,  the reduction  in overall  interest  rates  lower  interest  costs  of
central  bank  bonds  and  reduce  central  bank financing  requirements.  The  net
effect  is to leave  the  financing  requirement  roughly  unchanged.
The scenario  in  Table  8 still  has the  shortcoming  of continued  high
inflation  of 24  percent. Therefore,  in Table  9  we present  a simulation  in
which  inflation  is reduced  by nearly  14  percentage  points  over  1989-91,
stabilizing  at a rate  of 10.6  percent  in 1992. The  same  real  interest  rate
decline  and  change  in structure  that  held in the  previous  simulation  is
assumed  here.  The  reduction  in inflation  requires  a reduction  in  money
creation  that  reduces  the  net  financing  of the  total  public  sector  from  4.8
percent  of  GDP in 1988  to  2.5  per  cent  of  GDP in  1991,  increasing  again  to 2.9
percent  of GDP in 1992. The  decline  in  nominal  interest  rates  reduce  central
bank financing  requirements  from  0.8  percent  to 0.4  percent,  while  the  nominal-18-
flow  of development  lending  also  falls. The  conventional  financeable  deficit
must be temporarily  reduced  to 1.3  percent  of GDP  in 1991,  after  which  it
stabilizes  at a long  run  level  of 1.7  percent  of GDP  in 1992  and after.
Interpretation  of results
The limitations  of this  kind of  model  should  be  well understood.
Although  the  model  can  capture  the  transitions  from  one  financial  equilibrium
to another,  it  does  not include  other  short-term  shocks  that  perturb  financial
markets  and  the  general  price  level  (bad  harvests,  financial  panics,  etc.).
Thus,  interest  rates  or inflation  may  move in the  short  run  for  many other
reasons  than  those  in  the  model. However,  the  model  is  useful  to illustrate
the fundamentals  that  determine  interest  rates  and  inflation  in the  absence  of
short-term  disturbances.
The  exact  magnitudes  calculated  for  required  deficit  reduction
should  also  be interpreted  cautiously,  since  they  depend  on  many parameters
whose  values  can  only  be approximated.  The  deficit  reductions  appear  to be
quite  modest  in  view of the  significant  decreases  in real  interest  rates  and
inflation  in  the simulation.  This  reflects  the  low  elasticities  with respect
to interest  rates  of investment  and  financial  asset  demands  implied  by the
results  of table  6. A  reduction  in  interest  rates  thus  does  not  lead  private
credit  demand  to increase  much,  nor  private  financial  savings  to decrease
greatly. This  result  is  crucial  to the  results  and  thus  would  bear  further
study.
The  results  are  also sensitive  to the  projected  growth  rate (4.5?
over 1989-92  in  the  current  simulation).  A  lower  growth  rate  would  decrease
the  financing  available  for  a given  debt  ratio,  and  thus  require  a greater
deficit  reduction. For  example,  if  growth  were to  only  be 2? over  the  period,
then the  deficit  in  the  simulation  of reduced  interest  rates  and inflation-19-
would  have  to be reduced  to 0.62  of GDP  by 1991,  as compared  to 1.32  with the
higher  growth  rate.
Conclusions
The  fiscal  adjustment  during  1985-87  was impressive  compared  to the
previous  large  fiscal  deficits. It  was  due  to structural  changes  in  acal
policy  and  not  simply  to fortuitous  events  such  as the  coffee  boom. Although
losses  of public  financial  institutions  were important  in some  other  Latin
American  countries,  there  is  no direct  evidence  that  they  were a  major  factor
in  Colombia. A  small  quasi-fiscal  loss  of Banco  de la  Reptiblica  and  other
other  public  financial  institutions  is  suggested  by the  data,  but it  was not
the  dominant  factor  in fiscal  behavior.
Although  the  fiscal  adjustment  was impressive,  it fell  short  of
actually  improving  the  net financial  position  of the  government. Total  public
debt  as  a percent  of GDP  was roughly  unchanged  from  its  1984  value  at the  end
of 1987,  even  when  we correct  for  the  effect  of currency  devaluation  on
dollar-denominated  instruments.  Public  development  lending  as a ratio  to GDP
fell  slightly  from  1984  to 1987.
Perhaps  in  part  because  of this  public  debt  behavior,  real  interest
rates  remained  very  high,  while  inflation  accelerated  slightly. To build  upon
the  adjustment  achieved  thus  far  would  likely  require  reductions  in interest
rates  and  inflation. The  model  presented  attempts  to calculate  the  fiscal
deficit  reductions  that  would  be  necessary  to achieve  this  objective.
The  results  of the  simulations  suggest  the  difficult  challenges
faced  by fiscal  policy  in the  years  ahead. To reduce  interest  rates  to  more
manageable  levels  would  require  continued  reduction  in the  fiscal  deficit,
below  levels  currently  envisioned.  To also  attain  the  laudable  goal  of
inflation  reduction  would  require  even  tighter  fiscal  policy. Hlowever,  the-20-
deficit  magnitudes  suggested  do  not seem  out  of reach,  even if  we allow  for
uncertainty  as to the  exact  figures. This  suggests  that  in  additlon  to the
commendable  efforts  shown  thus  far,  continued  policy  initiative  would  be very
helpful  in confronting  the  fiscal  challenges  of the  1990's  in  Colombia.- 21  -
TABLE  1:  STRUCTURAL  TRENDS  IN  FISCAL POLICY
Proj  Proj  Proj
Percent  of  CDP  (-  d.ficit/-surplus)  1964  1965  190t  1907  19U  1969  1990
Total  consolidated  public  sector  deficit  6.76  .15U  -0.10  1.60  2.90  2.91  2.30
corrected  for:
FNC  -0.41  1.80  -. 161  0."  0.85  0.10  0.82
ECOPETROL  -0.15  1.10  0.24  -0.98  0.t4  -0.09  -0.40
National  govprimsnt--t4mporary  iteos\1  0.09  0.11  0.44  0.70  0.10  0.18  0.18
Structural  deficit  7.42  8.95  8.22  2.6e  2.86  2.72  2.51
corrected  for:
External  Interest  1.68  1.94  2.27  2.09  8.01  8.42  8.48
Domeotic  interest  0.77  O.9  0.70  0.9S  0.99  0.90  0.61
Structural  prima-y  deficit  5.02  1.02  0.20  -1.10  -1.66  -1.60  -1.78
corrected  for:
Fixed capital  formtion  t.73  *.27  6.40  5.62  5.99  7.91  *.17.
Structural  primary  currwet  detIcit  -8.76  -7.26  43.20  -S."2  -7.61  -9.51  -9.9
\1  Includes  coffee  tax  (2.51),  ECOPETROL  trannfere  and bockpeymnt  of  duties.  FWC  transtfr.,
Decreto  899-1966,  and special  revenue  from  the  tax  amnesty  (In  1907).- 22  -
TABLE  2:  Cuenta  Especial  de  Cambios--Banco  de la  Republica
till  Juno
PERCENT  OF  GDP  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Net  income  from:  1.38  0.15  0.79  1.53  1.29
foreign  exchange  reserves  (net)  0.13  0.09  0.22  0.42  0.34
interest  earnings  0.26  0.25  0.41  0.54  0.57
interest  payments  0.13  0.16  0.18  0.12  0.23
other  net reserve  income  0.44  0.01  0.21  0.29  0.04
gold  0.43  0.02  0.11  0.29  0.03
other  0.01  -0.00  0.09  0.00  0.01
purchase  and sale  of foreign  exchange  0.77  -0.01  0.29  0.79  0.93
exchange  rate  differentials-external  credit  0.04  0.04  0.07  0.03  -0.02
Expenditure  on:  0.78  0.46  0.82  0.92  0.81
Titulos  canjeables  0.30  0.30  0.72  0.83  0.73
Administration  costs  of  CEC  0.07  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.04
Reserves-exchange  rate  differentials  0.40  0.11  0.06  0.06  0.04
Net  balance  0.60  -0.32  -0.03  0.61  0.48
Net  balance  excl foreign  exchange  transaction  -0.17  -0.31  -0.32  -0.18  -0.46
Source: Contraloria  de la  Republica,  Infonme  Financiero- 23  -
Tablo  8:  Interest  ratee  for  Fondoo  Financieroo  and  hypothetical  operating  losses
1985  1966  1987  1968
(Noveber)
Interest  rates  paid  on crodit  rooources  (percent)
FFAP  16.7  16.2  19.6  22.a
FIP  22.7  21.1  24.a  28.8
FFI  29.7  21.7  22.0  24.4
FCE  24.0  21.8  24.0  26.4
Level  of crodit  resources  by  Fond.  (percent  of  CDP)
FFAP  1.70  1.65  1.48  1.21
FIP  0.15  0.18  0.12  0.10
FFI  0.10  0.07  0.04  0.03
FCE  NA  0.04  0.18  0.17
Average  Interost  rate  for  four  Fondoo  16.6  20.6  23.0
Interest  rates  recolved  on loans  by  Fondo.
FFAP  16.6  19.8  19.1  19.0
FIP  25.1  24.5  26.9  26.9
FFI  22.0  22.1  23.4  24.7
FCE  10.8  19.0  28.8  25.O
PROEXPO  22.0  22.0  22.0  NA
Loans  by  Fondo  (percent  of  COP)
FFAP  1.69  1.58  1.41  1.16
FIP  0.15  0.12  0.11  0. ;^
FFI  0.17  0.12  0.10  0.0
FCE  NA  0.18  0.15  0.1
Average  interest  rate  on ionding  by  Fondon  19.0  20.2  20.4
(except  PROEXPO)
Hypothotical  operating  profit  (+)/  lose  (-)  of  Fondoo Financieroo  (percent  of  GDP)\
FFAP  -0.15  -0.18  -0.18  -0.18
FIP  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01
FFI  -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.00
FCE  NA  0.01  -0.02  -0.02
Total  four  Fondoc  -0.12  -0.14  -0.17- 24  -
TABLE  4:
Not  finnelng  flow  of  consolidatod  central  bank  and nonfinancial  pubilc  s*ctor--Inf  ltion  adjusted
(perceont  of  GO)
19N  19#O  197
Currency  hold  by  public  1.1  0.7  1.2
S Ignorag.  0.2  -0.1  0.3
Inflation  tox  0.9  0.9  0.0
Reserves  0.6  1.0  0.7
$*1gnorage  0.1  0.6  0.2
Inflation  tax  0.5  0.5  0.6
Forced  Investments  0.4  0.0  -0.1
by  private  financial  system  0.  0.0  -0.1
by  public  financial  institutions  0.1  0.0  0.0
Bonds  of  nonfinancial  private  s*eor  1.0  0.4  -0.1
Lending  by  private  financial  system  -0.4  0.0  0.4
Lending  by  public  financial  system  0.7  1.8  0.3
Total  domsetic  finance  3.4  4.3  2.8
Exter  eal  lending  3.6  8.0  -0.9
Capital  losses  -)  -10.4  -7.6  -7.7
Nominal  change  14.0  10.5  6.8
Forel  n  exchange  resrves  -0.°  -4.0  0.7
Capetl  galns  2.2  1.6  2.3
Nominal  change  -3.0  -5.6  -1.7
Total  external  finance  2.3  -1.0  -0.3
Total  financing  6.2  3.3  2.1
Public  nonsonotary  aoots  0.2  1.2  -0.4
Lending  by  fondos  financiero.  -0.1  0.0  0.0
Financial  support  of  banking  systm  -0.1  1.5  -0.1
Other  rediscounts  to  banking  syt_m  0.0  0.3  -0.3
Rodiscounto  to  prlvate  sector  0.4  -0.5  0.0
Total  not  financing  6.0  2.0  2.6
Memo:
N-t  financing  unadjusted  for  Inflation,  adjusted  for  capital  geIns  5.9  2.4  2.6
-- consolidated  nonfinancial  public  sector  5.0  1.3  1.8
-- 4snco  de  In  Republics  0.9  1.1  0.9
Nonfinancial  public  sector  deficit-sonventional  measure  3.6  -0.2  1.6- 25  -
Toblo  S:  PUs  LC  OT  tATIOS
PERCENT  P  am  104  1o"  10  1907
Sae Money  3.5  0.3  7.0  7.9
-- Currency  5.5  5.3  4.7  4,
--R  rve  8.0  3.0  *.2  a
Net  Internal  Debt  5.0  0.  *.1  7
-- Forced  lnveetente  r.1  1.3  *.0  2
by  private  financial  system  2.0  2.1  2.0  2
by public  fl.e..l.l  Institutions  0.1  0.2  0.2  0
-- onds  of  nontineancial  priva seater  (exchange  rate  adjueted  2.0  3.3  3.4  1
-- Lending  by private  ti  alonal  system  lets  depogt.  0.7  0.3  0.5  0
--Lending  by public  financlal  *yte looo depsite  -0.6  0.0  1.2  1
Net  External  debt (volued  at 1907  reel  exchange  rate)  23.6  26.1  23.9  22
-- External  liabilitleoe  Ie  nonmeneotry  depoelte  10.3  13.  34.09  32
-- Net  International  reervee  -46  -7.2  -11.0  -_
Total  public  debt  20.4  *.0  32.0
Public  nomenetary  aseete  4.0  4.0  4.7  i
-Lending  by *ordee  firancleroe  2.4  2.2  2.0  1
-Financial  support  of  banking  syatm  0.6  0.5  1.0
Other  redicounte  to  boaking cytm  1.0  1.7  1.0
-- Redlecounte to  private  seor  0.0  0.4  -0.1
Total  net  non_eeetry  liabilities  24.5  20.2  27.2  20.2- 26  -
REGRESSION  I  TABLE  6
SMPL  1972  - 1987
16  Observations
LS  //  Dependent  Variable  i-  LCUREA
Convergence  achieved  after  3  iterations
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  -6.6216688  2.4247631  -2.7308519  0.018
CPIYTY  -0.5148596  0.2800343  -1.8385588  0.091
LGDP  0.9379755  0.1837274  5.1152574  0.000
AR(1)  0.5788390  0.2492560  2.3222665  0.039
========3===5==========  --  =-=========  …===53=====
fe-squared  0.941127  Mean  of  dependent  var  5.54eeO5
Adjusted  R-squared  0.926408  S.D.  of  dependent  var  0.188232
S.E.  of  regression  0.051063  Sum  of  squared  resid  0.031289
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.212913  F-statistic  63.94250
Log  likelihood  27.19350
REGRESSION  II
3MPL  1973  - 1987
15 Obsarvations
LS  //  Dependent  Variable  is LRM2CU
Convergence  achieved  after  3  iterations
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  -21.087270  3.1139532  -6.7718649  0.000
LGDP  2.1221520  0.2363564  8.9785327  0.000
RLR2  0.4062346  0.2555644  1.5895587  0.140
------------------------------------------------------------- __-----
AR(1)  0.6134617  0.2422598  2.5322475  o.028
R-squared  0.985502  Mean  of  depandent  var  6.77914 -:
Adjusted  R-squared  0.9e154e  S.D.  of  dependent  var  0.403074
S.E.  of  regression  0.054753  Sum  of squared  resid  0.032977
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.39809E  F-statistic  249.2-397
Log  likelihood  24.61590
REGRESSION III
,MFL  1972  - 1985
14 Observations
LS  // Dependent  Variable  is  IVPGDF
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  SD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
======m====t=========…-=_==  =  - - --  ===== ==  -==a=  =
C  11.755552  0.47647-54  24.673966  0.000
RLR2  -11.633157  5.1697259  --.25029246.3  0.044
=======c====~~~~~~~  ===  ====  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  ==  =  =  =  =  ,  =,  =  =  …==  =
R-squared  0.2976749  Mean  of  deoendent  var  11.3591c
Adjusted  R-squared  0.238145  S.D.  of  dependent  var  1.89765L
3.E.  ot  regression  1.656,56  3um  of  squared  resid  9.9=2(:)
DLurbin-Watson  stat  1.?46i65  F-statistic  5.0675609
Log  likelihood  -25.a5077
…===-==========  …======-======  = ===-=  = ===s-27-
Notes
Regression  I
LCUREA:  log  of real  currency;  source  for  currency: Revista  del  Banco  de la
Republica,  various  issues.
CPIYTYt  Consumer  Price  Index,  year-to-year  rate  using  December  data;  Source:
BESD,  World  Bank.
LGDP:  log  of real  GDP;  source: Revista  del  Banco  de la  ReRublica,  various
issues.
AR(l):  Auto regression  correction  factor.
Regression  II
LRM2CU:  log  of real  H2  minus  real  currency  (both  deflated  by  year-to-year
CPI rate  using  December  data);  source  for  M2 and  currency: Revista
del  Banco  de la  Republica,  various  issues.
LGDP:  log  of real  GDP; source: Revista  del  Banco  de la  Republica,  various
issues.
RLR2:  Nominal  CDT interest  rate  (yearly  average)  deflated  by Consumer
Price  Index,  year-to-year  rate  using  December  data;  source  for
1972-1986  CDT rate: Colombia  CEM,  World  Bank,  Oct.  15,  1987,  for
1987  Revista,;  source  for  CPIu BESD,  World  Bank.
AR(1):  Auto regression  correction  factor.
Regression  III
IVPGDP:  Private  Investment  as a ratio  to  GDP, source: Cuentas  Nacionales,
DANE,  various  issues.
RLR2:  Nominal  CDT interest  rate (yearly  average)  deflated  by Consumer
Price  Index,  year-to-year  rate  using  December  data;  source  for
1972-86  CDT  ratet  Colombia  CEH,  World  Bank,  Oct.  15,  1987,  for  1987
Revista;  source  for  CPI:  BESD,  World  Bank.TAKE 7  FISCAL  POLICY  SILATION:  Interest  rate  and  Inflaticn  unchanged  from 1WO
Percet  of  Mr  Estimated  Projected  Projected  Projected  Projected  24-Ne1-1
1965  19"  1967  191  169"  1990  1991  1992  07:46:29  FM
Nminel  Pam  14.5  6.1  8.7  9.7  8.6  6.6  8.6  8.6
Not eacheng  rate  l_wmee  9.5  6.8  7.0  8.8  8.0  *.0  6.0  6.0
Deicit  excluding  exchanig rate  Iose"  5.0  1.3  1.8  2.9  2.6  2.4  2.4  2.6
Conventional deficit  8.6  -0.2  1.6  2.7  2.4  2.5  2.4  2.4
;eeldl  1.4  1.5  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
Net dmtic  Internet  paymte  0.9  0.8  0.9  1.2  1.1  1.0  1.0  0.9
Net eateranl  intret  payments  1.9  2.3  2.9  2.8  2.J  2.6  2.8  2.8
rlmry  deficit  2.2  -1.7  -2.0  -1.2  -1.J  -1.2  -1.2  -1.1
Conventional prinry  deficit  0.7  -4.2  -2.2  -1.4  -1.5  -1.4  -1.J  -1.8
Semidaal  1.4  1.5  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
Centra  bank not  financing  reuiremt  -0.3  0.2  -0.J  -1.0  -0.8  -0.8  -0.8  -0.6
net  excane  rate  loees  -1.8  -0.9  -1.  -1.9  -1.6  -1.6  -1.6  -1.6
et fiacing  exacliudng  exchang  rate  gein/l_oee  0.9  1.1  0.8  0.s  0.6  0.8  0.9  0.9
- lomeme  - develpmt  lending  0.8  0.4  0.2  0.8  0.2  0.8  0.8  0.8
-- other  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.8  0.6
Coeol  itlic  aectwr finncing  (;ncl  central  ben)  .9  8.5  8.1  4.8  4.4  4.4  4.8  4.5
money  creation  1.7  1.7  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.6  1.6  1.8
rerve  0.8  1.0  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7
currency  1.1  0.7  1.2  1.1  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.1
band,  to  private  sctor  1.1  0.7  0.2  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7
foreign  borrowing (not  of  nmn  dep eWn rtee  Joao)  8.6  8.1  -0.9  0.9  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1
foreign  eamcnge reserves  (net  of  *rate  gain  -0.8  -4.0  0.7  -0.8  -0.8  -0.8  -0.8  -0.J
a"  borrowing from privet  financial  Ineittutien  -0.8  0.8  0.8  0.5  0.1  0.8  0.8  0.8
ne  berrowine frm  public  financial  inai  ;tiamae  0.5  1.2  0.a  0.4  0.8  0.8  0.1  0.S
forced  WA  reserve  Investmet.  0.9  0.6  0.4  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6
Ceneol public  sector  borroming  re.Ireent--brmd.n  6.9  8.5  8.1  4.8  4.4  4.4  4.5  4.511
Ne  denclt-cont  bit4  ( eel  grate  loe")  8.4  2.4  2.6  J.7  8.4  8.6  5.8  8.511
Credit  by  fond_  financiero.  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5
Financil  eeXpper  of  banking  Wate*  0.0  1.0  0.2  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8
Credit  to  private  ector  0.4  -0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Other  redecoumte to benks  0.8  -0.8  0.1  0.8  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
R_edual  (enistenc  chech)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Inflation  rate  (OF  defltr)  24.9  2.4  24.8  261.5  24.0  24.0  24.0  24.0
Iflation  rote  (CPI)  21.6  21.6  22.7  26.5  24.0  24.0  24.0  24.0
Interet  rate.  (nQminal)
--deposit  85.9  32.1  84.2  40.5  re.f  85.9  8e.9  8.9
-- leading  45.6  41.2  41.4  48.7  43.8  48.5  41i.5  48.5
-Paid  on forced  Iavesomnt.  17.2  17.2  17.2  22.4  18.1  1.1  U6.1  It.I
-do"eopmt  lendIng  22.  22.6-  81.4  86.7  81.9  81.9  8.9  1.9
lnterest  rate.  (Remi)
Idp  t  6.  2.9  *.0  9.4  9.6  9.6  9.6  9.8
-leading  16.8  10.0  18.  15.7  15.7  15.7  15.7  15.7
-- aid  on forced  Investments  -. 2  -8.J  -5.7  -4.7  -4.7  -4.7  -4.7  -4.7
--development lending  -1.6  -4.6  5.7  6.8  6.4  6.4  6.4  *.4
Interest  rote  different-lm
dAPe it  Minu_  forced  Inveteant  1U.7  e6.0  17.0  1U.1  17.8  17.J  17.J  17.8
-- lendisi  enine  dwelopmnt  lIedng  22.7  18.6  10.0  12.0  11.6  11.6  11.6  .11.
roreh rato  8.1  5.1  *.4  8.7  4.a  4.a  4.5  4.5
et  long-term extenal  public  finalning  (Il1mlillen)  1140.9  1011.9  -S10.8  87.7  42.1  484.1  456.6  474.0
Debt ratiem  (end of  period)
Internal  pblic  debt  6.9  8.1  7.9  8.2  6.1  8.1  6.1  *.1
External  public  det  24.7  26.1  22.5  22.5  22.5  22.5  22.5  22.5TAMLE S  FISL  PUCI  SDATW4:  Pl  I  in  interae.t  rat"e
Percent of  C0P  btimted  Projet  Pjeced  ProjOcted  Projected
ies  iss  9Ws  1s  lo"  900  1001 
N.sinPl  IIIR  14.5  0.1  0.7  9.7  *.0  7.0  7.7  0.2
ie  exaange  rate  losee_  e.  *.0  7.0  0.0  0.0  *.0  0.0  0.0
DOficit  eclcding  e*ucheeg  rte  Ia  5.0  1.e  1.e  2.0  2.1  1.e  1.e  2.2
C4oetionel  dficit  8.0  -0.2  1.e  2.7  1.9  1.7  1.0  2.1
sidtUl  1.4  1.5  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
l4s  d_e;tic  interoe  pVayen  0.9  0.2  0.9  1.2  1.1  0.J  0.4  0.8
ie  eutereel  interst  palmnat  1.9  2.J  2.9  2.0  2.J  2.0  2.0  2.4
Primrp  deficit  2.2  -1.7  -2.0  -1.2  -1.0  -1.7  -1.0  4.9
CQnvetional  Priftr7  deicit  0.7  -4.2  -2.2  -1.4  -2.0  -1.9  -1.7  -1.1
Seidool  1.4  1.5  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
Can"il  ben  net financing  roqiroset  -4.8  0.2  -0.  -1.0  -0.6  -0.0  -0.9  -0.
*a  exchi_geate  lesseI  -1.8  -4.9  -1.6  -1.9  -1.6  -1.6  -1.0  -i.e
Nart  fi  enc  excluding  eseckw  rate  gsineJbosse  0.9  1.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
-- oee  an  dvelopamt  lending  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.2
- r  0.6  0.7  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Coneul pbl}c  e ctr  financing  (mncl cetrl  banh)  0.9  5.5  8.1  4.0  *.9  8.7  8.5  4.0
- oycreaticn  1.7  1.7  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.6  1.6  1.6
remerve  0.6  1.0  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7
currenwc  1.1  0.7  1.2  1.1  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.1
hand  ho privabe  metor  1.1  0.7  0.2  0.0  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7
foreign  boercolmg (n"e  of  m  do  and iars  laes)  8.8  8.1  -4.9  0.9  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1
foeign  exchange  reerves  (not  ef  orate  gain  -0.0  -4.0  0.7  -0.8  -0.8  40.8  4.3  4.8
a"  borroeing  from private  finanial  lestlItle,  -4.3  0.°  0.6  0.0  4-.4  4 .8  4.7  40.
ae  bwrrsing  fro  public  fionelal  lnstit"mte  0.0  1.2  0.0  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4
forced  wan re  ro  lnvestnts  0.9  0.4  0.4  0.7  0.4  0.0  0.6  0.0
Cel  pblic  aewtwr borrowing  n  0.9  8.8  8.1  4.0  3.9  8.7  8.5  4.0
Net deficit-Cent  bIM  (ovgl  srate  l  seo1  )  5.9  2.4  2.6  2.7  2.9  2.7  2.1  8.0
Credit  by fonde  fifemciere  0.3  0.6  0.3  0.0  O.8  0.5  0.5  0.5
Financial  sport  of  bontins  ates  0.0  1.0  0.2  0.8  0.8  0.0  0.8  0.8
Creit  to  private  sector  0.4  4.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Other rodiscats  to  bent  0.8  o.8  0.1  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
Residual  (coneistency  chec_)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
lfltion  rate  (P  dflater)  24.9  0.4  24.S  :  2I.S  24.0  24.0  24.0  24.0
if  stios  rate  (CM)  21.0  21.0  22.7  21.5  24.0  24.0  24.0  24.0
ntaoeret rates  (Nainal)
-- deposit  5.9  l2.1  84.2  40.5  31.6  80.6  27.7  27.7
-leoing  40.5  41.2  41.4  40.7  40.2  86.2  62.2  62.2
-paid  do  forced  inosotsf  17.2  17.2  17.2  22.4  06.4  5.4  1.9  2t.i
-deolepamt  leding  22.0  02.0  81.4  80.7  n1.9  3.9  81.9  81.9
Interest  rate  peel)
-d4eit  0.6  2.9  8.0  0.4  7.0  5.5  .0  O.0
-lowing  10.8  10.0  18.0  1S.7  13.1  9.8  6.4  0.4
-paid  an  forced  Invobesent,  -0.2  4.6  -4.?  -4.7  -1.2  4.4  0.0  0.0
-devel  pmnt  l  ding  -1.0  -4.5  5.7  6.5  0.4  6.4  0.4  0.4
interest  rat,  differentials
-deboasi  minus forced  inveetssnt  10.7  13.0  17.0  18.1  11.4  7.8  8.7  8.7
-lowing  sinus  iulopeet  lending  22.7  16.6  10.0  12.0  U.S  4.5  0.8  0.8
Growth rote  8.1  5.1  5.4  5.7  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5
et long-tsr  external  public  financing  (Isillion)  1140.9  1011.9  -810.3  827.7  422.1  484.1  4U3.0  474.0
Debt ratice  (end of  period)
internal  public  debt  0.9  8.1  7.9  8.2  ?.0  7.0  6.3  6.5
ExternaI  public  debt  24.7  25.1  22.5  22.5  22.5  22  .5  22.  S  22.5TABE  9  FISCAL POLICY SD6ATION:  Fa11  in  interet  rate.  and  inflation
Percent  of  CDP  Eatimted  Projected  Projected  Projected  Projected
196  1966  1487  19D6  1969  1990  1991  1992
Nominal  PSOR  14.5  8.1  8.7  9.7  6.0  6.1  4.4  4.9
"at  exchange  rate  1_  9.5  6.8  7.0  6.8  6.0  4.3  3.0  3.0
Deficit emcluding  eachange  rate  lome  6.0  1.3  1.8  2.9  2.1  1.7  1.5  1.9
Conventional  deficit  3.6  -0.2  1.6  2.7  1.9  1.4  1.3  1.8
RAel dual  1.4  1.6  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
Net  dometic  interest  payments  0.9  0.8  0.9  1.2  1.1  0.6  0.3  0.2
Not  enternal  interest  paymnte  1.9  2.3  2.9  2.6  2.8  2.S  2.0  2.8
Primery  deficit  2.2  -1.7  -2.0  -1.2  -1.6  -1.7  -1.6  -1.1
Conventional  primry  deficit  0.7  -3.2  -2.2  -1.4  -2.0  -1.8  -1.6  -1.3
Riedual  1.4  1.6  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
Central  bank  not  financing  reuiremnt  -0.0  0.2  -0.6  -1.0  -0.8  -0.3  -0.4  -0.4
not  exchenge rate  o  -1.3  -0.9  -1.6  -1.9  -1.6  -1.2  -0.8  -0.6
Not  financing  eacluding  exchange  rate  g.in./loe  0.9  1  I  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.5
-- lo_e_  on  development  lending  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.8  0.3  0.1  -0.1  -0.1
-- other  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6
Conol  public  sector  financing  (inc  central  bakk)  6.9  8.8  3.1  4.0  S.9  3.1  2.5  2.9
mey  creetion  1.7  1.7  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.6  1.2  1.1
reserves  0.6  1.0  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.S  0.4  0.4
currency  1.1  0.7  1.2  1.1  1.2  1.0  0.8  0.7
bonds  to  private  sector  1.1  0.7  0.2  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.4  0.4
foresin  borrowing  (net  of  nonm  dep  an  wrate  lao)  3.6  3.1  -0.9  0.9  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.3
foreign  sichang  re_erves  (net  of  wrate  gain  -0.8  -4.0  0.7  -0.6  -0.3  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4
net  borrowing  from  private  financial  inatitutioa  -0.S  0.3  0.S  0.5  -0.4  -0.5  -0.6  0.0
net  borrowing  from  public  financial  institutions  0.S  1.2  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2
forced  wa  reserve  invstments  0.9  0.6  0.4  0.7  0.6  0.4  0.3  0.3
Coneol  public  sector  borrowing  reuiremnt--broeabde  6.9  8.5  8.1  4.8  8.9  3.1  2.5  2.9
Net  deficit-cent  bk  (sard  wrate  loeeee1  )  5.9  2.4  2.6  3.7  2.9  2.4  1.9  2.4
Credit  by  fondoe  financiere  0.8  0.3  0.3  0.6  0.8  0.4  0.6  0.3  w
Financial  upwort  af  banking  etm  0.0  1.6  0.2  0.S  O.S  0.2  0.2  0.2  0
Credit  to  private  *er  0.4  -0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Other  rediecounte  to  banjo  0.8  -0.3  0.1  0.6  0.2  0  .2  0.1  0.1
Resiul  (co.  iotoncy  check)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Inflation  rate  (MI  deflator)  24.9  2B.4  24.3  29.5  24.0  16.8  10.6  10.6
Inflation  rate  (CP7)  21.8  21.6  22.7  28.5  24.0  16.3  10.8  10.6
Interest  rates  (Nainal)
-- dep;oit  85.4  S2.1  34.2  40.5  66.6  28.5  15.0  1i.0
-- lending  48.8  41.2  41.4  48.7  40.2  28.2  18.2  13.2
-- paid  on  forced  investmnts  17.2  17.2  17.2  22.4  22.4  15.4  4.9  9.9
-dev1eloment  lending  22.*  22.6  31.4  S3. 7  81.9  2.9  17.9  17.9
Interert  rates  (Real)
-- deposi t  6.6  2.9  6.0  9.4  7.9  6.2  4.0  4.0
-- lending  18.3  10.0  13.8  IS.7  13.1  10.2  *.9  6.9
--Paid  on  forced  invesments  6.2  -4.8  -o.7  -4.7  -1.2  -0.8  -0.6  -0.6
-development  lending  -1.8  -4.5  5.7  6.3  6.4  *.5  4.6  6.6
Interest  rate  differentiele
--d  ;t  i;num  forced  invetmant  18.7  15.0  17.0  18.1  11.4  6.1  o.1  5.1
-lening  sinu  development  lending  22.7  18.6  10.0  12.0  0.3  4.J  0.3  0.3
Growth  rate  8.1  5.1  5.4  8.7  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5
Not lonterm  external  public  financing  (UImillion)  1140.9  1011.9  310.3  W27.7  422.1  496.1  642.0  366.4
Debt  ratios  (end  of  period)
sternal  public  debt  6.9  6.1  7.9  6.2  7.6  7.0  6.4  6.5
External  public  debt  24.7  2S.1  22.5  22.5  22.6  22.5  22.5  22.5-31-
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APPENDIXt  MODEL  OF GOVERRMENT  DEFICIT  FINANCE
Model  equations
The  model  presented  in  equations  (l)-(23)  has  a simple  structure,
although  the  notation  is rather  dense. The  first  part  of the  model is  a
conventional  set  of  portfolio  equations  for  the  private  sector. There  are six
assets:  currency,  BR bonds,  government  bonds,  deposits  in public  financial
institutions,  deposits  in  private  financial  institutions,  and  foreign  assets.
We assume  a three  stage  process  of portfolio  choice. First,  individuals
determine  how  much  currency  they  need  based  on transaction  volume  and  the  rate
of inflation. Second,  they  divide  their  remaining  portfolio  between  domestic
and foreign  assets,  according  to  the  domestic  interest  rate  less  the  rate  of
devaluation  (which  is assumed  to  equal  the  rate  of inflation).15  Third,  they-
divide  domestic  assets  into  the  four  types  based  on fixed  proportions. The
fixed  proportions  reflect  convention,  since  the  four  domestic  assets  are
assumed  to carry  the same  intarest  rate  and  to be  perfect  substitutes.  The
proportions  used in  the  model  are  those  existing  at the  end  of 1987.
Private  savings  is  assumed  to  be determined  by the requirement  that
the  ratio  of gross  financial  assets  to  GDP stay  at the  desired  level,  which  is
here taken  as the  1987  level. The flow  of savings  will thus  be this  ratio
times  the  rates  of current  inflation  and  growth.  There  will be an adjustment
factor  in the  denominator  reflecting  the  fact  that  we use last  year's  ratio  to
give  this  year's  saving. The  ratio  needs  to be accordingly  deflated  by one
plus the  rates  of inflation  and  growth. Thus,  no matter  what the (positive)
15.Foreign  interest  rates  enter  here  of course,  but they  are  assumed  to stay
constant  and so  drop  out  of the  equations  expressed  in terms  of changes.-34-
rates  of inflation  and  growth,  the  factor  which  multiplies  the  desired  asset
ratio  will always  be between  zero  and  one.
The  net savings  of Banco  de la  Repdblica,  public  financial
institutions,  and  private  financial  institutions  will be given  as their
interest  income  minus  their  interest  expense,  shown  in equations  (7)  through
(9).
External  debt flows  are  assumed  to  be such  as to  maintain  the  ratio
of debt stocks  to  GDP  constant. However,  as  a policy  parameter,  we allow  for
a change  in the  ratio  of government  debt  to GDP.
Private  sector  credit  demand  is  assumed  to  be separated  from  private
sector  asset  accumulation  decisions.  We have in  mind a  world  where  the
private  sector  is  divided  functionally  between  those  who save (e.g.
households)  and  those  who borrow  and  do  physical  investment  (e.g.  firms). The
private  sector  credit  demand  can  thus  be thought  of as an investment  demand
function. The  credit  demand  is a function  of the  real  interest  rate  on loans.
If the  real  interest  rate  is  unchanged,  then  the  ratio  of private  credit  to
GDP is  maintained  over  time.
The loan  interest  rate  can  be related  to the  deposit  interest  rate  by
taking  into  account  reserve  requirements  and forced  investments.  If the  only
variables  that  change  are  other  domestic  interest  rates,  then  the  change  in
the  deposit  rate  will be given  by the  change  in the  loan  rate  adjusted  for  the
reserve  requirement,  minus  the  change  in the  differential  between  loans  and
forced  investments  times  the  forced  investment  ratios  (equation  14).
Reserves  and forced  investments  are  determined  on the  basis  of fixed
ratios  applied  to deposits  in  public  and  private  financial  institutions
(equations  15 through  21). The ratios  are  calculated  on the  basis  of stocks
outstanding  at the  end of 1987.-35-
Other  financial  flows  not represented  in these  equations  are
determined  on the  basis  of  maintaining  constant  the  ratio  of the  financial
stock  to GDP that  prevailed  at the  end  of 1987.
Equation  (22)  shows  the  total  net financing  available  to the
government. This  represents  the  nominal  change  in  net financial  assets,
including  the  effect  of devaluation  on foreign  assets  and  liabilities.  Thus,
this  can  be thought  of as the  total  public  deficit  plus  net  capital  losses.
Adjustments  for  capital  gains  and inflation  are  ther  made  to get  to the
figures  shown  in  the  main text.
The financing  of the  government  deficit  includes  loans  from  Banco  de
la  Rep6blica,  public  financial  institutions,  and  private  financial
institutions.  forced  investments  from  public  and  private  financial
institutions,  government  bonds  held  by the  private  sector,  and  external  debt.
We have to subtract  asset  accumulation,  which includes  deposits  in  Banco  de la.
Rep6blica,  and in  public  and  private  financial  institutions,  as  well as
foreign  deposits.
The loans  from  Banco  de la Rep6blica  in turn  must be financed  by
reserves  from  financial  4nstitutions,  currency  holdings  by the  private  sector,
forced  investments  by financial  institutions,  bond sales  to the  private  sector
and  financial  institutions,  and foreign  debt. We must subtract  other  credit
creation  by BR,  including  rediscounts  to public  and  private  financial
institutions  and  the  private  sector,  and  the  loans  of the  fondos  finrncieros.
Finally  we must subtract  international  reserve  accumulation  by BR.
The  two  financing  identities  can  be consolidated  by substituting  for
central  bank  credit  in (22)  using (23). We then  arrive  at financing  for  the
total  public  sector,  which is  what is shown  in  the  tables  shown  in the  text.-36-
Solution  of the  model
The  model  has  two  key  equlibrating variables--inflation  and  the  real
interest  rate.  In  principle,  the  model  could  be solved  for  equilibrium
inflation  and  interest  rates  for  a given  fiscal  deficit  and  assumed
composition  of its  financing. However,  it is computationally  easier  and
intuitively  appealing  to turn  the  model  around  and  solve  for  the fiscal
deficit  and  its  financing  composition  for  given  inflation  and  interest  rates.
This  can  be seen  as giving  the  required  deficit  level  and  financing
composition  for  target  rates  of interest  and  inflation. The  model  then
becomes  a set  of recursive  equations  which  can  be solved  in  any  simple
software  such  as  Lotus  1-2-3.
The solution  of the  model  proceeds  as  follows. An inflation  rate  and
real  loan  interest  rate  are  set  exogenously. The  model  then  solves  for  the
real  deposit  rate  using  (14). Private  sector  currency,  deposit,  and loan
flows  follow  from (1)  through  (5)  and (13). Reserve  and  forced  investment
flows  follow  from (15)  through  (21). External  debt flows  are  determined  from
(10)  through  (12). The  balancing  item  in the  balance  sheet  of  private
financial  institutions  is credit  to the  public  sector. In  effect,  any  credit
resources  left  over  after  private  credit  demands  have  been satisfied  at the
given  interest  rate  are  delivered  to the  government. Banco  de la  Rep6blica
also  delivers  residual  credit  to the  public  sector. Public  financial
institutions  are  assumed  to share  out  their  credit  resources  between  public
and  prisate  sectors  in fixed  proportions,  according  to a  policy-determined
rule.
This  procedure  thus  gives  us total  financing  available  to the
government,  and  the  public  sector  deficit  is  determined  endogenously.  The
composition  of the  deficit  between  different  types  of finance  is also
determined  by the  private  sector  money  and  deposWt  accumulation  in response  to-37-
the  specified  inflation  and  interest  rates. Different  simulations  can  then  be
performed  for  different  target  inflation  and interest  rates.
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Variable  definitions
Hp  currency  held  by nrivate  sector
P  General  price  level
Y  Real  GDP
r  inflation  rate
8  growth  rate
Bi  Banco  de la  Republica  bords  held  by sector  i
np  ratio  of gross  private  financial  savings  to  GDP
Ti  government  bonds  held  by sector  i
Dij  deposits  in sector  i  by sector  j
Sp  private  saving
Ni  net financial  assets  of sector  i
IEij  inversiones  del  encaJe  or forced  investments  made in sector  i by
sector  j
Lij  loans to  sector  i  by sector  j
Fi  peso  value  of external  debt  of sector  i
iD  deposit  interest  rate
iH  interest  rate  paid on loan3  of fondos  financieros
iG  interest  rate  paid  on forced  investments
iR  interest  rate  paid  on foreign  reserves  (in  dollars)
ilr  interest  rate  paid  on foreign  debt (in  dollars)
ic  interest  rate  paid  on loans  from  banking  system
e  rate  of exchange  rate  depreciation
RL  foreign  reserves  of sector  i (peso  value)
Qi  Central  bank rediscounts  to sector  i
QFF  Loans  by fondos  financieros
Parameters
pJ  reserve  requirement  for  public  financ-ial  institutions
PF  reserve  requirement  for  private  financial  institutions
bij  forced  investment  ratio  - directed  to sector  i from  sector  j
OH  ratio  of currency  to  GDP
derivative  of currency  ratio  wrt inflation
share  of BR bonds  in  private  domestic  non-currency  assets
share  of government  bonds  in  private  domestic  non-currency  assepts
share  of deposits  in  public  financial  institutions  in  private
domestic  non-currency  assets
#D  share  of domestic  assets  in  private  sector  non-currency  assets
+  D  derivative  of D vrt domestic  real  deposit  interest  rate
ratio  of  private  credit  to  GDP
derivative  of  #  vrt real  loan  interest  rate-42-
Notation conventions
Subscripts:
B  Banco de la Rep6iblica  (Central  bank))
G  Non financial public sector
J  Financial public sector
F  Financial private sector
P  Nonfinancial private sector
Other:
A  change during year
lower-
case
letter  Ratio of variable denoted by upper case letter to GDPPPR  Working PaDer Series
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